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DETERMINANTS OF EARLY RETIREMENT TRANSITIONS  
OF TEACHERS IN POLAND. 
DOES REGIONAL HETEROGENEITY PLAY A ROLE?
This article contributes to the literature on early retirement transitions by testing a line of explanations of this 
SKHQRPHQRQLQDVSHFL¿FFRQWH[WRISXEOLFVHFWRUHPSOR\PHQW,WXWLOL]HVZDYHVDQGRIDORQJLWXGLQDO
data set of employment histories of Polish teachers (SIO). Standard structural explanations of early retirement 
WUDQVLWLRQVLHODERUIRUFHUHVWUXFWXULQJDQGGHYDOXDWLRQRIKXPDQFDSLWDORIROGHUZRUNHUVGRQRW¿QGVXSSRUW
in the data. Multilevel logistic regression models show instead that the considerable variance in early retirement 
risks found in the data can to some degree be explained by labour mobility of prime aged teachers, support-
LQJWKHWKHVLVRIDODERUPDUNHWDVJHQHUDWLRQDO¿JXUDWLRQ7KHDQDO\VHVLGHQWLI\WZRHDUO\HPSORPHQWJURXSV
among Polish teachers: 49–54, and 55–59 year olds. Whereas retirement transitions in the younger group are to 
a greater extent attributable to individual pull factors (like work commitment), regional variation plays a greater 
role in the older “early retirees” group indicating higher risks of involuntary early retirement in this group.
.H\ZRUGVHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWWUDQVLWLRQSXEOLFVHFWRU3RODQGWHDFKHUV6\VWHP,QIRUPDFML2ĞZLDWRZHM¿JXUD-
tional theory of labour market
INTRODUCTION
For at least the past two decades scholars have been showing substantial interest in 
transitions from work to retirement. This attention is in large part fuelled by concerns about 
the demographic ageing processes observed in most Western societies, albeit with differences 
in pace and scope (Kalache, Barreto and Keller 2005; United Nations 2013). In the course of 
demographic ageing the relationship between contributors to the pension system and pension 
FODLPDQWVKDVEHHQFKDQJLQJGUDPDWLFDOO\PDNLQJ¿QDQFLQJRISHQVLRQV\VWHPVPRUHDQGPRUH
a burden for welfare state budgets (Gruber and Wise 2001; Roseveare, Leibfritz, Fore and 
Wurzel 1996). Moreover, it is believed that decreases in the number of people entering labour 
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markets may lead to substantial labour shortages unless they are counterbalanced by higher 
labour market participation rates of older workers (Henkens, Remery and Schippers 2008). 
These realizations have eventually led to a reversal in labour market policies, moving away 
from supporting early retirement – which was once favoured for its (alleged: Sackmann 1998) 
contribution to solving the problem of slack labour markets and high youth unemployment 
in the 1980s and 90s, as well as for its role in accelerating intergenerational exchange in the 
face of rapid technological changes (Kohli, Rosenow and Wolf 1983) – towards extending 
the length of individual labour market participation and postponing transitions to retirement 
(OECD 2013). 
$FFRUGLQJO\ WKHUHKDVEHHQJURZLQJVFLHQWL¿F LQWHUHVW LQH[SODLQLQJ WKHSURFHVVHVRI
labour market exit. Whereas socio-gerontological literature is concerned with individual 
level determinants of early exit like health (Rice, Lang, Henley and Melzer 2011), household 
situation (Loretto and Vickerstaff 2013) or attitudes (Jansen 2013) structural and institutional 
approaches tend to see early retirement as a result of structural pressures on the labour markets 
%ORVVIHOG%XFKKRO]DQG+RIlFNHU%XFKKRO]5LQNODNH6FKLOOLQJ.XU]HWDO
Diprete, Graaf, Luijkx, Tåhlin et al. 1997; Johnson and Zimmermann 1993; Kohli and Rein 
1991) or as an effect of generous retirement policy (Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999; Börsch-Supan 
2000; Hairault, Sopraseuth and Langot 2010). As yet, not much attention has been paid to 
regional and organizational contexts of transitions to retirement – other than those resulting 
from regionally/ organizationally unequal distribution of structural pressures (Buchholz 
2008) – although there is a substantial body of research showing that both geographic location 
(Fassmann and Meusburger 1997) and workplace organization (Baron and Bielby 1980) have 
an impact on employment trajectories of individuals. 
The article addresses these issues utilizing quantitative administrative data on teacher 
employment in Polish public schools while concentrating on factors driving early retirement. 
The employment structures in Polish public schools bear much resemblance to the ideal-typical 
model of internal labour markets, with major attention being given to employment stability and 
long-term work relations based on trust and commitment, although there are some weak signs 
RIJURZLQJH[WHUQDOÀH[LELOLW\.RS\FND$FFRUGLQJWRWKHFXUUHQWVWDWHRIUHVHDUFKLQ
such a type of labour organization in the face of external downsizing pressures we would expect 
WR¿QGDKHDYLHUUHOLDQFHRQHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWVFKHPHVWKDQLQFDVHVRIOHVVLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG
employment relations (Buchholz, Rinklake, Schilling, Kurz et al. 2011; Doeringer and Piore 
1985; Lutz 1987; Sackmann and Bartl 2007). Indeed, early retirement schemes have been 
used extensively in Polish schools over approximately the last two decades as a reaction to 
the shrinking student population (Kopycka 2013). However, the individual-level data shows 
a considerable regional variance in the risk of early retirement, which only to a slight degree 
can be explained by regional disparities in demographically induced pressures to reduce the 
workforce. The analyses show instead that the major factors explaining the regional variety 
of early retirement risks are on the one hand the local economic situation and the level of 
mobility of the prime age employees on the other.
The article starts with a review of literature and theory on early retirement transitions, 
according to which hypotheses are formulated (section 2). In the next section a short description 
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of data and variables used is offered (section 3). The results of the conducted analyses are 
presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
2QHRIWKHPRVWLQÀXHQWLDOH[SODQDWLRQVRIWKHSUHYDOHQFHRIHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWSKHQRPHQD
relates employment exit decisions to the shape of the pension system. This microeconomically 
informed view depicts the retirement decision as a rational choice between staying in 
employment and exiting the labour force made on the basis of differences in the subjective 
expected utility of both options. The assumption is that individuals prefer leisure to work, 
DQGWKHPRUHJHQHURXVWKHLUSHQVLRQLQFRPHLVDQGWKHHDUOLHUSHQVLRQEHQH¿WVDUHDYDLODEOH
the more frequent the incidence of early retirement will be. To the extent to which pension 
payments are not actuarially fair there exists an implicit tax on employment in the late 
career, which acts as a strong disincentive to work until the statutory retirement age (Blöndal 
and Scarpetta 1999; Duval 2003; Gruber and Wise 1998). Börsch-Supan (2000) shows in 
an international comparison of several European countries, Japan and the USA a striking 
resemblance between spikes in retirement transition occurrence along the late life course and 
NLQNVLQWKHFRXQWU\VSHFL¿FDFFUXDOIXQFWLRQRISHQVLRQZHDOWK,QDQHFRQRPHWULFPRGHO
based on German microdata he demonstrates the negative relationship between a retirement 
decision and an option value of staying employed and retiring at some other point in time, 
where the value of the option is a positive function of the difference between labour income 
DQGWKHOHYHORIWKHSHQVLRQEHQH¿WDWDJLYHQSRLQWLQWLPH,QPXFKWKHVDPHPDQQHULQ
France Hairault, Sopraseuth and Langot (2010) recently found strong negative effects of 
reaching pre-retirement eligibility both on employment rates as well as on job search efforts 
in case of unemployment. 
With regard to Polish teachers in the period under consideration (2006–2007) there was 
a generous early retirement scheme for this occupational group granting them the right to 
retire after having accumulated at least 30 qualifying years, 20 of which had to be spent 
actively teaching, irrespective of their age. The early retirement scheme had been intro-
duced in the early 1980s as a part of a special labour law for teachers and other educational 
service occupations (see also Chlon, Góra and Rutkowski 1999; Kopycka 2013). Because 
one’s time studying at university and other common employment breaks like family care, 
child bearing and unemployment count as qualifying periods, for many teachers it was 
possible to retire as early as age 49 (assuming here that one starts university studies at 19 
with no more than 5 years of employment breaks during their career). This early retirement 
path was open until the end of 2008. However, teachers who acquired retirement rights 
by this date were able to retire early on the basis of this scheme in the following years 
as well. The early retirement path for teachers was also strongly actuarially unbalanced, 
DVWKHUHZHUHQRUHGXFWLRQVLQEHQH¿WVLQFDVHRIDQHDUO\WUDQVLWLRQWRUHWLUHPHQW$VWKH
early retirement path for teachers did not contain any regional elements there is no reason 
to expect any regional variance in early retirement behaviour, should an early retirement 
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WUDQVLWLRQ EH D YROXQWDU\ GHFLVLRQ IROORZLQJ WKH PD[LPXP XWLOLW\ UXOH +HQFH WKH ¿UVW 
hypothesis states:
+5HDFKLQJWKHDJHRIHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWHOLJLELOLW\ZLOOLQFUHDVHWKHSUREDELOLW\RIH[LWLQJ
HPSOR\PHQWLQWKHVDPHPDQQHUDFURVVDOOPXQLFLSDOLWLHV
According to Catherine Hakim’s theory of work-family life preferences (2002), there 
is, however, an interpersonal variation in the responsiveness to institutional incentives with 
regard to individual labour market involvement. Hakim analyses lifestyle choices of women 
and postulates the existence of three distinct preference groups among them concerning their 
involvement in paid work. Work-centred women have a clear preference for employment or 
equivalent activities in the public sphere over family life. They are not responsive to family 
policy. Home-centred women on the other hand prefer not to work and are not responsive 
to labour market policy. The majority of women fall into the third, adaptive, type, which 
is characterised by the desire to combine both work and family life and for whom Hakim 
assumes a high responsiveness to both family as well as labour market policy. The idea 
RISUHIHUHQFHGLYHUVLW\FRQFHUQLQJZRUNOLIHVW\OHFKRLFHVFDQHDVLO\EHDSSOLHGWRWKH¿HOGRI
retirement decisions. With the rise of early retirement options there has been a growing 
destandardisation of transition to retirement (Kohli 1994) enabling a diversity of individual 
preferences concerning the time of employment exit to come to the fore. Along these lines 
9LGRYLüRYiLGHQWL¿HVWKUHHJURXSVRIHOGHUO\LQWKH&]HFK5HSXEOLFZLWKUHJDUGWRWKH
level of activity in old age: active, adaptive and inactive, and assumes that among the inactive 
there will be the highest probability of early retirement. Soidre (2005) has applied preference 
WKHRU\WRWKHTXHVWLRQRIUHWLUHPHQWWUDQVLWLRQLQ6ZHGHQ+H¿QGVWKDWZRUNDWWLWXGHVH[HUW
a substantial effect on the desired retirement age. Persons with intrinsic work motivation 
were less inclined to retire early than persons working mainly for pecuniary reasons. Jansen 
(2013) shows in a multilevel logistic model that personal beliefs about the ideal retirement 
DJHVLJQL¿FDQWO\LQÀXHQFHRQH¶VSURSHQVLW\WRUHWLUHHDUO\HYHQDIWHUFRQWUROOLQJIRULQGLYLGXDO
VRFLRHFRQRPLFYDULDQFHDQGIRUWKHLQÀXHQFHRIFRXQWU\VSHFL¿FUHWLUHPHQWWUDQVLWLRQFXOWXUHV
It will be therefore assumed here that the individual propensity to early retirement will depend 
on the level of individual work commitment.
+:LWKWKHJURZLQJLQGLYLGXDOZRUNFRPPLWPHQWRIWHDFKHUVWKHSUREDELOLW\RIHDUO\UHWLUH
PHQWWUDQVLWLRQGHFUHDVHVDFURVVDOOPXQLFLSDOLWLHV
1RW GHQ\LQJ WKH LQÀXHQFH RI LQVWLWXWLRQDO HDUO\ UHWLUHPHQW LQFHQWLYHV RQ LQGLYLGXDO
withdrawal from the labour force, many scholars make a different argument: that various early 
retirement paths are merely a reaction of welfare state social policy to structural pressures 
on the labour markets which have arisen from economic developments since the early 1980s 
(Ebbinghaus 2006; Kohli and Rein 1991). Processes of globalisation and the emerging world 
economy have led to an increasing international division of labour in which low-skilled jobs are 
being relocated to countries with lower wage levels. In consequence the structure of national 
economies in the developed countries changes: old industries are shrinking while new high 
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VSHFLDOLVHGSURGXFWDQGVHUYLFHVHFWRUVDUHHPHUJLQJ%ORVVIHOG%XFKKRO]DQG+RIlFNHU
In the course of this process a need to relocate the labour force from shrinking to growing 
sectors arises (Diprete, Graaf, Luijkx, Tåhlin et al. 1997). 
Furthermore, due to rising interconnectedness the level of economic uncertainty rises. 
Interdependent relations on the world market lead to the spread of economic turbulence and 
PXOWLSO\ WKH HIIHFWV RI UDQGRP H[WHUQDO VKRFNV &DVWHOOV $V D UHVXOW ORFDO ¿UPV
and industries face higher levels of economic volatility. The accelerating social change also 
leads to changes in consumers’ behaviour, necessitating a growing diversity of products and 
shortening of production cycles. Global competition and diffusion of knowledge utilising 
new information and communication techniques result in a higher pace of technological 
LQQRYDWLRQ%ORVVIHOG%XFKKRO]DQG+RIlFNHUQHFHVVLWDWLQJUDSLGDGDSWDWLRQRI WKH
organisation of production to new technological developments (Kohli and Rein 1991). Higher 
uncertainty levels, short planning and production cycles, high speed of technological change 
and growing international competition on the world product markets make the dominant 
structure of labour relations in the form of big internal labour markets obsolete and demand 
D QHZ VRFLDO RUJDQL]DWLRQ RIZRUN DOORZLQJ IRU KLJKHU ÀH[LELOLW\ LQ WKH XVH RI ODERXU DV
DIDFWRURISURGXFWLRQHJVXEFRQWUDFWLQJ¿[HGWHUPHPSOR\PHQW$VDFRQVHTXHQFHRI
this restructuring process the problem of an excess core workforce appears. 
How these two structural problems (the relocation of workforce from shrinking sectors to 
growing ones and the reduction in the number of core employees) are met, however, depends 
RQWKHVKDSHRIQDWLRQDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHJLPHVZKLFKGH¿QHLQWHUGHSHQGHQWUHODWLRQVDPRQJ
various groups of workers and therefore structural risks and opportunities at the individual level. 
Firstly, the level of occupational segmentation determines the costs of occupational mobility. 
Systems with comparatively weakly developed occupational training structures display higher 
levels of inter-occupational mobility, and changing occupations also results to a lesser extent 
in downward mobility in terms of pay (Büchtemann, Schupp and Soloff 1993). In highly 
developed occupational training systems, in contrast, the occupational mobility is constricted 
by stiff occupational boundaries constituted by an elaborated system of occupational titles 
(Marsden 1999; Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre 1986). Such segmentation reduces transaction 
FRVWVDQGLVJHQHUDOO\VXSSRUWLYHWRLQWHU¿UPPRELOLW\6WUXFNDQGIDFLOLWDWHVWUDQVLWLRQV
from education to employment (Allmendinger 1989; Gangl 2001; Müller and Gangl 2003; 
Scherer 2001; 2005). Nevertheless, the effective blockage of occupational mobility leads to 
VLWXDWLRQVLQZKLFKFKDQJHVLQWKHTXDOL¿FDWLRQVWUXFWXUHRIWKHODERXUIRUFHUHO\PDLQO\RQ
intergenerational exchange, slowing down the adjustment process of the occupational structure 
to a new distribution of labour demand (Blossfeld and Stockmann 1998/1999). In the face of 
such occupational barriers there is a strong incentive to use early retirement schemes, as they 
serve as an accelerator of the intergenerational occupational restructuring (Diprete, Graaf, 
Luijkx, Tåhlin et al. 1997).
6HFRQGO\WKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOVKDSHRIODERXUUHODWLRQVDQGWKHOHYHORIVRFLDOVHFXULW\EHQH¿WV
ERWKLQÀXHQFHWKHZD\ODERXUPDUNHWULVNVDUHGLVWULEXWHGDPRQJWKHODERXUIRUFH$ORQJWKH
lines of the widely cited “Varieties of Capitalism” approach by Hall and Soskice (2001) two 
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ideal types of industrial relations can be differentiated. In liberal market economies the level 
of employment protection regulation is rudimentary, employee representation is weak and 
employment stability depends to a greater extent on the individual work-related resources of the 
worker (e.g. the level of human and social capital). In coordinated market economies the level 
of protection against dismissal is high, employment relations are initiated with a perspective 
on longer duration and employee representation bodies play an important role in shaping 
personnel management strategies of the companies. Whereas the low level of employment 
protection in liberal market economies leads to a distribution of unemployment risks according 
to the level of individual labour market resources, the high level of employment protection 
in coordinated market economies produces systems of closed positions (Sørensen 1983), in 
which exit mobility until the mandatory retirement age occurs solely voluntarily. Protection 
against dismissal, which favours certain groups of workers against others, leads labour market 
risks to concentrate on particular groups of workers, namely entrants and outsiders (Lindbeck 
and Snower 1988). Moreover, in the face of restructuring and/or downsizing pressures such 
structures tend to bring about high numbers of early retirement transitions, because early 
retirement is seen as the most socially acceptable way to shed excess personnel (Blossfeld, 
%XFKKRO]DQG+RIlFNHU&DVH\0HWFDOIDQG0LOOZDUG.RKOL5RVHQRZDQG:ROI
1983).
Putting issues of employment protection aside, Hutchens (1999) shows that generous 
VRFLDOVHFXULW\EHQH¿WVPD\OHDGWRHQKDQFHGHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWWUDQVLWLRQVDUHDFWLRQWRGHPDQG
shocks. In the course of falling demand for a company’s products the productivity of its 
workers falls. In such a situation early retirement schemes may work as a social security 
EHQH¿WVXEVLGL]LQJHPSOR\PHQWUHGXFWLRQVVRWKDWGLVPLVVDOVFRQFHQWUDWHGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\
on elderly workers (Dorn and Sousa-Poza 2008).
Similar structural pressures like sectorial change and demand shocks necessitating 
workforce reductions can be traced in developments within the Polish educational sector. 
Firstly, in the course of transformation and education reforms of the late 1990’s and after the 
2000 the national school curriculum changed (Sackmann, Bartl, Jonda, Kopycka et al. 2015). 
Directly following the abrupt change in 1989, the main foreign language taught in schools, 
Russian, was replaced by Western European languages, primarily English and German. At 
that time religion was also re-established as a school subject (Hörner and Wompel 1994). 
,QIRUPDWLRQ WHFKQRORJ\ KDV UHSODFHG GRPHVWLF DQG WHFKQLFDO FRXUVHV DQG VXEMHFWVSHFL¿F
courses have been rearranged into comprehensive forms of teaching. Music and drawing have 
been replaced by “arts”, and biology, physics and chemistry have been combined into “science”. 
$W WKH VDPH WLPH TXDOL¿FDWLRQ UHTXLUHPHQWV FRQFHUQLQJ WHDFKHUV KDYH EHHQ LQFUHDVLQJO\
strict (Kopycka 2013). In sharp contrast to Germany, for example, there is a strong subject 
specialisation of teachers. As a rule, teachers in Poland upon graduation have the right to 
teach only one subject. In order to be able to teach any other subject, even a related one, they 
QHHGWR¿QLVKSRVWJUDGXDWHVWXGLHVWDNLQJDVDUXOHWKUHHRUIRXUVHPHVWHUV7KH3ROLVKWHDFKHU
labour market is, hence, strongly segmented along subject lines. Under such conditions the 
FKDQJHLQFXUULFXOXPOHDGLQJWRGLVFUHSDQFLHVEHWZHHQWKHTXDOL¿FDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHRIWKH
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ZRUNIRUFHDQGQHZTXDOL¿FDWLRQGHPDQGVWUXFWXUHPD\UHVXOW LQKLJKUDWHVRI LQYROXQWDU\
HDUO\UHWLUHPHQWDVDZD\WRDFFHOHUDWHDQLQWHUJHQHUDWLRQDOH[FKDQJHRITXDOL¿FDWLRQSUR¿OH
of the workforce.
+%HLQJTXDOL¿HGWRWHDFK³FRQWUDFWLQJ´VXEMHFWVZLOOLQFUHDVHWKHULVNRIHDUO\UHWLUHPHQW
DFURVVDOOPXQLFLSDOLWLHV
Secondly, since the early 2000s Polish schools have witnessed a fall in student numbers 
as a consequence of a low fertility trend in in the late 1980s (Kotowska 2002). There are 
UHJLRQDOYDULDWLRQVRIWKLVSURFHVVKRZHYHU5]ąGRZD5DGD/XGQRĞFLRZD6KULQNLQJ
student population translates into a demand shock which puts pressure on public schools to 
reduce personnel. At the same time Polish teachers enjoy high levels of employment protection 
(Kopycka 2013). Under such circumstances personnel reduction is achieved mainly via early 
retirement schemes (Buchholz, Rinklake, Schilling, Kurz et al. 2011).
+7KHULVNRIHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWZLOOEHJUHDWHUIRUWHDFKHUVHPSOR\HGLQPXQLFLSDOLWLHVZLWK
IDOOLQJVWXGHQWQXPEHUV
Since as early as 1980, however, the seminal analysis of mobility processes conducted 
by Baron and Bielby (1980) has convincingly shown that explanations focussing on macro-
structural effects alone may be, under certain circumstances, incomplete. It is, therefore, at 
the level of organization that individual social mobility is decisively shaped, and what can 
be observed at the sectorial or national level is merely an aggregation of these processes. 
Organizations differ with respect to their personnel policies and in this way create different 
environments for returns on human capital (Hendry 2003; Lepak, Liao, Chung and Harden 
2006; Struck and Dütsch 2012). In the same manner and more recently Baron et al. (2007) 
were able to conclude that chances for career advancement of women are closely related to 
the level of bureaucratisation of personnel decision-making adopted in a given organisation. 
6LPLODUO\'WVFKDQG6WUXFNKDYHIRXQGVXEVWDQWLDO¿UPOHYHOHIIHFWVRQ WKHULVN
of unemployment in phases of economic downturn and on the chances of upward mobility 
ZKLOHFKDQJLQJ¿UPV$OVRUHVHDUFKRQRUJDQL]DWLRQDOGHPRJUDSK\KLJKOLJKWVWKHLPSRUWDQFH
RI¿UPOHYHODQDO\VLV,QDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKLVOLQHRIDUJXPHQWDWLRQFDUHHUSURVSHFWVDUH
related to internal organizational structure, understood as a system of positions on different 
KLHUDUFKLFDO OHYHOVDVZHOODV WR WKHGHPRJUDSKLFVWUXFWXUHRID¿UP¶VHPSOR\HHV6WHZ-
PDQDQG.RQGD)XUWKHUPRUHRUJDQL]DWLRQDOG\QDPLFVKDYHDGHFLVLYHLQÀXHQFHRQ
employees’ careers, as prospects of advancement are higher in growing than in shrinking 
organizations. 
With respect to retirement transitions there has not been much interest in organisational 
factors as yet, although Buchholz (2008) has found substantial effects of organizational size 
RQWKHULVNRIHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWLQ*HUPDQ\%LJ¿UPVWHQGWRUHO\PRUHRQHDUO\UHWLUHPHQW
schemes in their personnel policies than do small ones. Analogously, Bellman and Janik (2010) 
FRQ¿UPWKHULVNLQFUHDVLQJHIIHFWRIELJ¿UPVRQHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWWUDQVLWLRQVDQGDOVR¿QG
a minor positive correlation between the use of early retirement and the presence of workers’ 
representation (%HWULHEVUDWLQD¿UP
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$PRQJRWKHUIHDWXUHV¿UPVDOVRGLIIHULQWKHZD\WKH\UHDFWWRPDUNHWWXUEXOHQFHDQG
in this way may have a strong mediating effect on the relation between structurally induced 
demand shocks and employment prospects of employees. According to Boyne (2006), 
in the face of falling performance organizations may adopt any of three (not mutually 
H[FOXVLYHVWUDWHJLHVUHWUHQFKPHQWZKLFKLVDLPHGDWFXWWLQJXQSUR¿WDEOHEUDQFKHVRIDFWLYLW\
UHSRVLWLRQLQJZKLFKLVLQVWHDGIRFXVHGRQJDLQLQJQHZPDUNHWVDQGH[SDQGLQJLQWRQHZ¿HOGV
of activity or new markets; and lastly reorganization, involving changes to the internal structure 
of an organisation allowing for a reorientation in human resource management, in control and 
communication schemes and the like. Reorganisation may also facilitate the implementation 
of the other two strategies. It is intuitive that the adoption of any of these strategies will have 
varying consequences for the employees. A retrenchment reaction to a demand shock will 
generate excessive pressure to reduce personnel, whereas in the course of repositioning current 
employment levels may be maintained and personnel reduction mostly avoided.
With regard to the Polish school sector there is a wealth of evidence on different 
expansion strategies that are being adopted in the face of demographic decline (Kopycka 2008; 
2013; Sackmann, Bartl, Jonda, Kopycka et al. 2015). Their scope, however, varies across 
municipalities. Hence, the level of educational investment in a given municipality can be 
considered a manifestation of their different reactions to a demographically induced demand 
shock: either the strategy of retrenchment or the repositioning strategy, leading potentially 
to different consequences for teacher early retirement transitions.
+,QPXQLFLSDOLWLHVZKHUHHGXFDWLRQDOH[SHQVHVSHUVWXGHQWDUHKLJKWHDFKHUVIDFHOHVV
ULVNRIHDUO\UHWLUHPHQW
Eventually, research indicates substantial effects of regional context on employment 
FDUHHUV,QWKLVUHVSHFW:LQG]LRDQDO\VHVWKHLQÀXHQFHRIUHJLRQDOXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHV
RQLQGLYLGXDOVSDWLDOMREPRELOLW\DQG¿QGVDQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQWKHWZR*URWKHHU
6WUXFN%HOOPDQQHWDO¿QGGLIIHUHQWHIIHFWVRIUHJLRQDOXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHVRQMRE
mobility in West and East Germany. While in the west this impact is positive, in the east 
higher rates of unemployment promote higher levels of job stability. Clark (1998) shows for 
86UHJLRQVDVXEVWDQWLDOYDULDQFHLQODERXUÀXFWXDWLRQUDWHVZKLFKFDQQRWEHDWWULEXWHGWR
DUHJLRQVSHFL¿FLQGXVWU\PL[)DVVPDQQDQG0HXVEXUJHUDUJXHWKDWFRUHUHJLRQVRIIHU
better employment and career advancement chances than peripheral ones because primary 
labour markets tend to develop in more densely populated regions. With respect to early 
UHWLUHPHQWWUDQVLWLRQVLQ*HUPDQ\%HFNHUDQG%UXVVLJ¿QGVWURQJHIIHFWVRIUHJLRQDO
economic indicators on the propensity of early retirement. Both the economic growth rate 
and the rate of employment growth decrease the risk of early exit from work, although the 
authors do not specify mechanisms driving this regularity. It therefore remains open, whether 
higher levels of labour activity of the elderly are driven by their higher job stability or, to the 
contrary, by better re-employment chances in economic growth regions. 
Yet another way of thinking about regional effects in the late career stage is in terms of 
spatial and occupational segmentation of the labour market. Theories of migration and life 
course theories assume that spatial mobility decreases with age (Wagner 1990). According 
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to human capital theory (Becker 1962) one would also expect falling rates of reskilling with 
growing age, as the time left to make returns on investments in training decreases (Ehler 2010). 
,QOLQHZLWKWKH¿JXUDWLRQWKHRU\RIWKHODERXUPDUNHW6DFNPDQQLQGLYLGXDOHPSOR\PHQW
opportunities have to be regarded in terms of institutionally shaped interdependencies between 
groups of workers. In systems with no institutionalized employment protection the structural 
interdependency between groups of workers lies solely in the structural differences in human 
capital. In systems with institutionalized employment protection, however, dismissal costs 
enter the equation and differentiate relative costs of a layoff according to different protection 
levels of employee categories. It can, therefore, be expected, that in a labour market with 
high employment protection legislation (additionally enhanced by normative expectations 
HPERGLHGLQWKH¿JXUHRID³JRRGHPSOR\HU´DQGZLWKIDOOLQJODERXUGHPDQGWKHHPSOR\PHQW
prospects of elderly insiders, who can potentially be displaced via early retirement schemes, 
will depend on voluntary mobility of prime-age insiders. This, in turn, may be facilitated by 
economic and employment growth.
+,QPXQLFLSDOLWLHVZLWKKLJKHUH[LWPRELOLW\RISULPHDJHWHDFKHUVWKHULVNRIHDUO\UHWLUH
PHQWGHFUHDVHV
+,QPXQLFLSDOLWLHVZLWKDEHWWHUHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQWHDFKHUVIDFHOHVVHUHDUO\UHWLUHPHQW
ULVNV
DATA AND METHODS
The analyses are made with the SIO dataset, a unique administrative dataset comprising 
employment information on all teachers currently employed in Polish schools. The dataset is 
administrated by the Polish Ministry of Education (http://sio.men.gov.pl/) (Kopycka 2013). 
The information is gathered twice a year (in autumn and in spring) from schools, which are 
FRPSHOOHGWR¿OOLQDQRQOLQHTXHVWLRQQDLUHRQDUDQJHRIWRSLFVFRQFHUQLQJWKHVFKRRO$PRQJ
others, detailed individual-level information on teachers currently employed in schools is 
DOVRSURYLGHG$VHDFKWHDFKHUUHFHLYHVDXQLTXHLGHQWL¿HUWKHGDWDFDQEHWUDQVIRUPHGLQWR
a panel dataset, which makes it possible to track teachers’ employment careers as long as 
they stay employed in education. The dataset covers the years from 2005 on and is updated 
on a yearly basis. The subsample used for analyses in this article is constrained to teachers 
teaching in public schools and the available information covers two observation points: the 
\HDUVDQG,QRUGHUWRDVVHVVWKHLQÀXHQFHRIPXQLFLSDOLW\VSHFL¿FIDFWRUVWKHGDWDVHW
is supplemented by statistical information on municipalities provided by the Polish central 
VWDWLVWLFDORI¿FH LQ LWV ORFDOGDWDEDQN%'/DYDLODEOH WRGRZQORDGXQGHUKWWSVWDWJRYSO
bdl/app /strona.html?p_name=indeks). 
The hypotheses are tested using logistic regression and multilevel logistic regression 
models. Additionally, descriptive statistics for variables of interest are provided.
Due to data limitations it is not possible to observe early retirement transitions directly (the 
information is not available in the data). I therefore model exit from employment in schools 
instead, and assume that exits after reaching pre-retirement eligibility are in fact early retirement 
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transitions. Because the dataset does not include information on employment outside the public 
school sector, it cannot be excluded that some of the older teachers exiting schools take up 
employment in other occupations. The high occupational segmentation as well as advanced 
DJHRIWKHVHLQGLYLGXDOVPDNHVVXFKWUDQVLWLRQVWRRWKHURFFXSDWLRQDO¿HOGVUDWKHULPSUREDEOH
although this does not preclude working (in other areas) while in retirement. Teacher retirees 
ZKRDUHVWLOODFWLYHO\WHDFKLQJFDQQRWRQWKHRWKHUKDQGEHLGHQWL¿HGLQWKHGDWDVHWDVWKH
information on retirement status is not included. The operationalization of early retirement 
by means of exit from employment from schools has, therefore, some limitations, although 
the number of false positives and false negatives should not be very high.
With regard to independent variables used in the models the following indicators have 
been applied. Early retirement eligibility is operationalised as reaching a certain age. Two 
DJHUDQJHVDUHVSHFL¿HGIURPWRZKLFKPDUNVDYHU\HDUO\WUDQVLWLRQDQGIURPWLOO
59, which marks an early transition. Retirement transitions between the age 60 and 65 are 
treated as normal retirement age, as according to the Polish legislation (at the time the data 
is referring to) the retirement age for women was 60. As an indicator of work commitment 
the information on occupational advancement is applied. In the Polish teacher career path 
there are four promotion levels. Whereas at reaching the third level teachers acquire extra 
employment security, the fourth level guarantees them “only” an increase in salary. As 
the procedure of promotion requires additional effort, I assume that only those committed 
to the teaching profession will reach the highest promotion level. 
With regard to subject specialisation of a teacher I differentiate “contracting” and 
“growing” subjects from the rest. I locate contracting subjects in instruction areas where 
DQ LQWHUGLVFLSOLQDU\ DSSURDFK KDV EHHQ LQWURGXFHG UHTXLULQJ D QHZ TXDOL¿FDWLRQ SUR¿OH
of the teachers. It applies to music and drawing (which have been replaced by arts) as 
well as to chemistry, physics, geography and biology (which have been combined into 
science at the primary school level). Additionally I regard technical and domestic science 
as a contracting subject as it loses some of its importance in favour of information science. 
0RUHRYHUJURZLQJVXEMHFWVFDQEHLGHQWL¿HG7KHVHDUHHVSHFLDOO\:HVWHUQIRUHLJQODQJXDJHV
information science and physical education. As for demographically induced demand shocks, 
I operationalise them in terms of a percentual change in the number of children in school 
age living in a given municipality. Municipal spending on education is operationalised as 
the amount spent yearly per student in a given municipality. As far as the local economic 
situation is concerned I use two indicators: the unemployment rate, which is available for the 
administrational level of SRZLDW (a SRZLDW is comprised of approximately ten municipalities 
and is the second level of local administration); and GDP per capita, which is available at 
the sub-voivodeship level (SRGUHJLRQ).
RESULTS
Looking at the age distribution chart of teachers employed in 2006 in Polish public schools 
it is apparent that the number of employees decreases rapidly starting approximately at the 
time of early retirement eligibility (age 49, marked with a red line – see Fig. 1). 
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Figure 1. Age distribution of teachers employed in Polish public schools in 2006
The results of the random intercept multilevel logistic regression model (Tab. 1) 
corroborate this descriptive result. Indeed, being between 49 and 54 years old, a teacher faces 
an almost ten-times greater risk of exiting employment than a teacher in the prime age group. 
The relative risk also increases considerably for those between 55 and 59, as they face an 
almost 14 times higher risk of exit. The risk of employment exit then slightly declines for the 
group of 60 to 65 year olds. There is indeed, however, only a small number of teachers who 
reach this age in employment. The results are so far in line with the eligibility hypothesis (H1). 
7DEOHProbability of exiting employment in Polish public schools by age and other factors across 
municipalities. Random intercept logistic regression, odds ratios
Model 1
Age <27 1.39
Age 27–48 Reference
Age 49–54 9.67
Age 55–59 13.73
Age 60–65 12.98
Female 0.91
High work commitment (4th promotion level) 0.51
2nd promotion level and below 1.82
Fixed term employment 2.52
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7DEOHcont.
Lower university degree 1.29
Teachers’ vocational training 1.81
Lower educational level 2.84
Intercept 0.02
Intercept variance 0.08
N 312524
N municipalities 2224
Log-Likelihood –61638.21
AIC 123302.4
$OOFRHI¿FLHQWVDUHVLJQL¿FDQWDWSOHYHO
In order to assess the stability of these effects across municipalities I estimate random 
intercept regression models separately for age groups (see Tab. 4). The results with regard to 
the between-municipality variance of exit probability for different age groups are summarised 
in Table 2.
7DEOHInter-municipality variance of exit probability by age
Age 5HVXOWV
27–48 0.077
49–54 0.215
55–59 0.195
60–65 0.119
:HVHHDVXEVWDQWLDOYDULDQFHDWWKHORFDOOHYHOLQWKHLQÀXHQFHRIDJHHIIHFWVRQH[LWUDWHV
Furthermore, the level of variance depends on age. We see clearly that the place of employment 
LQÀXHQFHVWKHUDWHRIHPSOR\PHQWH[LWDERYHDOOLQWKHWR\HDUROGJURXSDQGVHFRQG
of all in the group of 55 to 59 year-old teachers, whereas the municipal level variance of exit 
probability in other age groups is considerably lower. With regard to retirement transitions 
it can therefore be concluded that being 60 to 65 years old increases the risk of retirement 
more or less in the same manner across all municipalities. This age range can therefore be 
considered as an age of voluntary (employee induced) retirement transitions. In contrast, higher 
municipality-level variance of transition risks in the two younger age groups suggests that 
these transitions are at least in some part involuntary. Early retirement transitions are therefore 
LQÀXHQFHGE\PXQLFLSDOLW\OHYHOIDFWRUVZKLFKVSHDNVDJDLQVWWKHHOLJLELOLW\K\SRWKHVLV+
109
Determinants of early retirement transitions of teachers in Poland
,QRUGHUWRDVVHVVWKHLQÀXHQFHRIZRUNFRPPLWPHQWDQGVXEMHFWRILQVWUXFWLRQRQWKH
probability of early retirement transition (hypotheses 2 and 3) I estimate logistic and multilevel 
logistic regression models for the group of older teachers. As an indicator for work commitment 
I use the achieved level of career advancement. Older teachers concentrate predominantly 
on the two highest promotion levels. Almost 55% of teachers aged 49 to 65 reach the third 
promotion level and almost 41% are on the fourth and highest level. Accordingly, less than 
5% of older teachers have achieved only up to the second stage of professional development. 
Reaching the highest promotion level seems therefore to be a well-differentiating feature, as 
WKHWHDFKHUSRSXODWLRQLVURXJKO\GLYLGHGLQWRKDOYHV:LWKUHJDUGWRTXDOL¿FDWLRQSUR¿OHV
that become “obsolete” in the course of curricular changes I pinpoint a few subjects in 
which the instruction time has been cut. These subjects include biology, chemistry, physics, 
geography and domestic and technical science. In the group of teachers aged 49 to 65 there 
DUH DSSUR[LPDWHO\  TXDOL¿HG LQ FRQWUDFWLQJ VXEMHFWV %HFDXVH , DP LQWHUHVWHG LQ DJH
VSHFL¿FHIIHFWV,HVWLPDWHLQWHUDFWLRQHIIHFWVRIZRUNFRPPLWPHQWDQGVXEMHFWRILQVWUXFWLRQ
with age. The results of the models are given in Table 3.
7DEOHProbability of older teachers to exit employment in Polish public schools by age, work 
commitment and subject of instruction across municipalities. Logistic regression and random 
intercept logistic regression
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 0RGHO
Age 49–54 í í í í
Age 55–59 í í í í
Age 60–65 Reference
High work commitment (4th promotion 
level)
í í
Up to 2nd promotion level í í
3rd promotion level Reference
High work commitment * age 49–54 í í
High work commitment * age 55–59 í í
Teaching a contracting subject í í
Teaching a contracting subject * age 
49–54
í í
Teaching a contracting subject * age 
55–59
í í
Sex (female) 0.22*** 0.28***
Intercept í í í í
Intercept variance 0.14
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7DEOHcont.
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 0RGHO
Random effect variance: high work 
commitment * age 49–54
0.06
Random effect variance: high work 
commitment * age 55–59
0.07
Covariance of random effects: high 
work commitment * age 49–54, high 
work commitment * age 55–59
0.01
Covariance of intercept and random 
effect: high work commitment * age 
49–54
0.06
Covariance of intercept and random 
effect: high work commitment * age 
55–59
0.06
N 45966 45966 45966 45966
N municipalities 2469 2469 2469 2469
Log likelihood –24099.489 í –24484.353 –24282.651
AIC 48212.98 47761.59 48982.71 48581.3
* S < 0.05, ** S < 0.01, *** S < 0.001
$FFRUGLQJWRWKHK\SRWKHVLVRIZRUNDWWLWXGHUHODWHGHDUO\UHWLUHPHQW+,H[SHFW¿UVWO\
WR¿QGHIIHFWVRIZRUNFRPPLWPHQWRQWKHSUREDELOLW\RIH[LWLQWKHWZR³HDUO\UHWLUHPHQW´
groups (aged 49 to 54 and 54 to 59) and no effects of work commitment in the group retiring 
at the “normal” retirement age between 60 and 65. In line with the expectations, the results 
UHYHDODVXEVWDQWLDODQGVLJQL¿FDQWHIIHFWRIZRUNFRPPLWPHQWLQERWK\RXQJHUDJHJURXSV
ZKHUHDVWKHHIIHFWRIKLJKHUZRUNFRPPLWPHQWLQWKHROGHVWJURXSRIWHDFKHUVLVLQVLJQL¿FDQW
at the 5% level (Model 2). Moreover, the risk of exiting employment for teachers aged 55 to 
ZKRGRQRWGLVSOD\KLJKZRUNFRPPLWPHQWLVQRWVLJQL¿FDQWO\ORZHUWKDQWKHULVNRIWKH
oldest group. Therefore, being 55 to 59 years old decreases the probability of exit only for 
the highly committed teachers. 
In the second step I estimate a multilevel logistic regression model in order to prove 
whether the effect of work commitment is also stable across municipalities (Model 3). The 
overall inter-municipality variance of log mean risk of exit in the following year in the group 
RI WHDFKHUVDJHG WR LV VLJQL¿FDQWDQGDPRXQWV WR ,IZHFRQVLGHU WKHHIIHFWRI
work commitment separately for the two “early retirement” age groups it shows, however, 
that its inter-municipality variance is higher than the mean variance (positive covariance), 
indicating that the effect of work commitment in these age groups is more dependent on 
the employing municipality than it is the case in the oldest group. It seems, therefore, that 
on the one hand persons with high work commitment have indeed a stronger motivation to 
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avoid early retirement, but on the other hand they are in some ways restricted in their choices 
by municipal-level factors. Figure 2 shows box plots of estimated overall effects of work 
commitment in both “early retirement” age groups for each municipality. 
Figure 2. Estimated effects of work commitment on exit probability among 49–54 and 55–59-year-
old teachers. Box plots
Indeed, high work commitment decreases the risk of early retirement in every municipality 
(entire box plots are below the zero line) and this result is therefore supportive of the second 
hypothesis. At the same time, the magnitude of this decrease shows substantial variance. 
We see that the effect of work commitment is stronger and also shows less variance in the 
younger group, whereas in the group of 55 to 59-year-old teachers it is less pronounced and 
varies more notably between municipalities. 
7XUQLQJWRWKHLVVXHRIWHDFKHUTXDOL¿FDWLRQSUR¿OHVDQGWKHLULQÀXHQFHRQHDUO\UHWLUHPHQW
SUREDELOLW\,H[SHFWWR¿QGDVLJQL¿FDQWSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRIWHDFKLQJD³FRQWUDFWLQJ´VXEMHFW
on exit probability in the two “early retirement” groups (H3). It is often argued that early 
retirement transitions result from the fact that human capital of older employees has lost its 
value in the course of rapid technological change. An abrupt change in school curricula should 
UHVXOWLQVLPLODUGHPDQGVKRFNVRQFHUWDLQTXDOL¿FDWLRQSUR¿OHVOHDGLQJWRH[FHVVLYHHDUO\
retirement transitions of those trained in subjects which have been reduced in scope. Against 
this expectation the results of logistic regression models (M4) show that the mean effect of 
teaching a contracting subject on the risk of retirement across all age groups of older teachers 
LVQRWVLJQL¿FDQW$OVRZLWKUHJDUGWRSDUWLFXODUDJHJURXSVQRVLJQL¿FDQWHIIHFWVFRXOGEH
observed. Controlling for municipality-level variance in the random intercept model (M5) 
KDVQRWDOWHUHGWKHVHUHVXOWV:HVHHQRVLJQL¿FDQWHIIHFWVRIVXEMHFWRILQVWUXFWLRQ7KHWKLUG
hypothesis must, therefore, be rejected.
In order to prove hypotheses 4 to 7 I estimate a range of multilevel logistic regression 
models for each age group separately, controlling for various municipality-level factors. The 
model estimates are summarized in Table 4. 
Age group 55–59 Age group 49–54
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7DEOHProbability of older teachers to exit employment in Polish public schools by age and municipality-level factors across municipalities. 
Random slope logistic regression
6SHFL¿FDWLRQ 27–48 ±
Model 6a 0RGHOE Model 6c Model 6d Model 7a 0RGHOE Model 7c Model 7d
Increase in student num-
bers in %
í í í –0.008*** –0.009*** –0.009***
Educational expen ses 
per student
0* 0* 0 0
Local GDP SHUFDSLWD 
(in % of national mean)
0 í
Local unemploy ment 
rate
0 0.003
Intercept í í í í í í í í
Intercept variance 0.077 0.075 0.072 0.071 0.215 0.194 0.190 0.180
N 241774 241774 241594 241594 36764 36764 36740 36740
N municipalities 2224 2224 2222 2222 2213 2213 2211 2211
Log-likelihood –28913.15 –28911.9 –28877.85 –28877.73 –16504.6 –16489.77 –16480.78
AIC 57844.3 57843.79 57777.7 57781.45 33027.2 32999.53 32983.56
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6SHFL¿FDWLRQ ± ±
Model 8a 0RGHOE Model 8c Model 8d Model 9a 0RGHOE Model 9c Model 9d
Increase in student num-
bers in %
–0.009*** –0.009*** –0.011*** í í í
Educational expen ses 
per student
0 0 0 0
Local GDPSHUFDSLWD 
(in % of national mean)
í í
Local unemploy ment 
rate
0.013** 0.009
Intercept í í í í í í í í
Intercept variance 0.195 0.186 0.186 0.118 0.119 0.140 0.147 0.106
N 9403 9403 9399 9399 2167 2167 2166 2166
N municipalities 1878 1878 1876 1876 989 989 988 988
Log-likelihood –5514.725 –5505.481 –5502.835 –5484.881 –1348.085 –1345.022 –1344.162 –1341.345
AIC 11047.45 11030.96 11027.67 10995.76 2714.17 2710.044 2710.324 2708.689
* S < 0.05, ** S < 0.01, *** S < 0.001
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ALL MODELS CONTROL  
FOR SEX, PROMOTION LEVEL, FIXED-TERM EMPLOY MENT, EDUCATION
:LWKUHJDUGWRWKHLQÀXHQFHRIFKDQJLQJVWXGHQWQXPEHUVRQWKHSUREDELOLW\RIH[LWLQJ
employment in public schools it has been hypothesized that declining student population 
causes a demand shock on a teacher labour market, which can be eased through early 
UHWLUHPHQW$FFRUGLQJWRK\SRWKHVLV,H[SHFWWKHUHIRUHWR¿QGVLJQL¿FDQWHIIHFWVRIDFKDQJH
in student numbers on the exit probability in the group of teachers in early retirement age. 
At the beginning of the 1990s Poland witnessed a major drop in fertility, which translates 
to decreasing group sizes of students. However, there is some regional variance as to how 
strongly different parts of Poland have been affected by low fertility. Utilising this variance 
it is possible to prove to what extent early retirement transitions are driven by falling levels 
of demand. Figure 3 shows the age distribution of teachers exiting schools in municipalities 
with growing and with falling numbers of children of school age. 
Figure 3. Age distribution of teachers exiting schools in municipalities with growing and falling 
numbers of children in school age
We can see a clear difference in the distributions. In municipalities with a decreasing 
student population those exiting schools are predominantly at the age of early retirement 
eligibility. This descriptive result therefore supports hypothesis 4. 
municipalities with up to 40% loss in student numbers, 1996–2005
municipalities with growing student numbers, 1996–2005
municipalities with above 40% loss in student numbers, 1996–2005
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Considering the results of multilevel logistic regression models presented in Table 4 we 
can, furthermore, assess how much of the inter-municipality variance in the probability to 
exit employment in different age groups is due to differences in student population dynamics. 
As I have already discussed with regard to hypothesis 1, the random intercept models not 
FRQWUROOLQJIRUDQ\PXQLFLSDOLW\OHYHOIDFWRUVVKRZVLJQL¿FDQWLQWHUPXQLFLSDOLW\YDULDQFHLQ
the exit probability in every age group (Model 6a through Model 9a). The variance is highest 
for teachers aged 49 to 54 and lowest for the group of 27 to 48-year-olds. If the employment 
H[LWG\QDPLFLVLQGHHGGULYHQE\DGHFOLQLQJVWXGHQWSRSXODWLRQ,ZRXOGKDYHWR¿QGDGURS
in municipality-level variance after controlling for change in student numbers. The estimates 
of the models 6b through 9b show an interesting pattern. The effect of student numbers is not 
VLJQL¿FDQWIRUWKHSULPHDJHWHDFKHUVKLJKO\VLJQL¿FDQWIRUERWK³HDUO\UHWLUHPHQW´JURXSV
DQGDJDLQEDUHO\VLJQL¿FDQWIRUWKHROGHVWJURXSRIWHDFKHUV,IZHFRQVLGHUWKHFKDQJHLQ
the municipality-level variance after controlling for the change in student numbers we notice 
little change. A drop is negligible in the prime age group. In the group of oldest teachers the 
estimates even show a rise in variance, which possibly indicates correlations with unobserved 
municipality-level factors. In contrast, controlling for change in student numbers reduces 
inter-municipality variance in both “early retirement” age groups. It is to the largest extent 
in the group of 49 to 54-year-old teachers and to a somewhat lesser extent in the group of 
WR\HDUROGV+\SRWKHVLVWKXV¿QGVVXSSRUWLQWKHGDWD$WWKHVDPHWLPHDQLQGHHG
rather moderate drop in variance indicates that there are other potentially stronger factors 
driving employment exit behaviour.
In line with the theoretical argument presented above, one such factor could be the level 
of investment in educational services. Following organisational theory of turnaround I assume 
that municipalities in the face of a declining student population might react by extending 
educational offers and increasing educational spending per student, in this way keeping the 
level of labour demand unchanged. Higher educational spending may therefore compensate 
for demographic declines in student numbers and diminish the pressure to reduce personnel. 
If early retirement decisions are structurally induced, higher educational spending should 
decrease the probability of exit in the “early retirement” age groups. Figure 4 presents the 
distribution of municipal expenditures on education per student. The distribution is steep 
and the standard deviation, at 146 thousand zloty, is rather low, indicating little variance in 
educational expenditures.
In order to check for the effect of the level of expenditures per student on early retire-
ment transitions of teachers we turn to the multilevel logistic regression models (Model 6c 
through Model 9c) summarised in Table 4. Against expectations we see that controlling for 
the level of educational spending per student across municipalities does not meaningfully 
decrease the level of inter-municipality variance in any of the age groups. At the same time, 
WKHHVWLPDWHGFRHI¿FLHQWLVQHJOLJLEOHLQVL]HDQGDOVRLQVLJQL¿FDQWH[FHSWIRUWKHJURXSRI
SULPHDJHWHDFKHUVZKHUHLWLVVLJQL¿FDQWRQO\DWWKHOHYHO+\SRWKHVLVPXVWWKHUHIRUH
be rejected.
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Figure 4. Educational expenses across municipalities. Kernel density plot
On the other hand, controlling for the local economic situation (the level of GDP per 
capita and the unemployment rate) brings more differentiated results. The multilevel logistic 
regression models (Model 6d through Model 9d) show that the local GDP per capita (as 
SHUFHQWDJHGLIIHUHQFH IURPQDWLRQDOPHDQ DQG WKH ORFDO XQHPSOR\PHQW UDWH VLJQL¿FDQWO\
LQÀXHQFHWKHSUREDELOLW\RIH[LWLQJHPSOR\PHQWLQVFKRROVLQWKHWZR³HDUO\UHWLUHPHQW´JURXSV
This effect is also in line with hypothesis 7. Higher GDP per capita and lower unemployment 
rates reduce the risk of exit among 49 to 54 and 55 to 59-year-olds. In contrast, the effect 
RIWKHVHHFRQRPLFLQGLFDWRUVLQWKHWZRRWKHUJURXSVLVQRWVLJQL¿FDQW)XUWKHUPRUHZKLOH
controlling for GDP and unemployment rate we also observe a strong decrease in inter-
municipality variance in the probability of exit for the groups of 55 to 59-year-old teachers. 
More than one-third of the entire inter-municipality heterogeneity with regard to exit probability 
in this group can therefore be attributed to the local economic situation. Hypothesis 7 can 
therefore be supported. There is also a small drop in variance for the younger group of 49 to 
54-year-olds; it is rather negligible, however. 
Eventually, in order to test for hypothesis 6 I have estimated random slope models 
allowing observation of how the effect of different age categories covary across municipalities 
(for model estimates see the annex). The results provide strong support for hypothesis 
 ,QGHHG WKHUH LV D QHJDWLYH FRYDULDQFHEHWZHHQ WKHPXQLFLSDOLW\VSHFL¿F HIIHFWV RQ DJH
category 27 to 48 (prime age) and both “early retirement” age categories. This indicates that 
in municipalities displaying an above-average probability of exit mobility in the prime age 
group the probability of exit in both “early retirement” age groups is indeed below average. 
Figure 5 illustrates this point.
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)LJXUH0XQLFLSDOLW\VSHFL¿FHIIHFWVRIDJHJURXS±DJDLQVWPXQLFLSDOLW\VSHFL¿FHIIHFWVRIDJH
groups 49–54 and 55–59, respectively
The correlation is stronger for the group of 55 to 59 year olds than for the group of 49 to 
\HDUROGWHDFKHUV7KHFRUUHODWLRQFRHI¿FLHQWDPRXQWVWRíIRUWKHWR\HDUROGV
DQGíIRUWKHWR\HDUROGV
Random effects of age 49–54
Random effects of age 55–59
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CONCLUSION
This article contributes to the literature on early retirement transitions by testing a line 
RIH[SODQDWLRQVRI WKLVSKHQRPHQRQ LQD VSHFL¿FFRQWH[WRISXEOLFVHFWRU HPSOR\PHQW ,W
utilises a unique dataset containing individual-level information on all teachers employed 
in Polish public schools in 2006 and 2007. An inspection of the age distribution chart of 
teachers has revealed two “early retirement” age groups (49–54 and 55–59), on which the 
following analyses concentrate. Multilevel logistic regression models show a substantial 
regional variance in the occurrence of early retirement exit, which challenges the view of 
these transitions being of solely voluntary character. Firstly, despite monetary conditions 
RIHDUO\UHWLUHPHQWEHLQJWKHVDPHDFURVVWKHZKROHFRXQWU\,¿QGDFRQVLGHUDEOHYDULDQFH
in the probability of exit in both “early retirement” groups across municipalities. Secondly, 
regarding the effect of work commitment on early retirement decisions there are regional 
differences to be found as well. More precisely, work commitment decreases the risk of early 
exit especially in the younger group (49–54 years), whereas in the older “early retirement” 
group its effect is not that strong and is more regionally differentiated, indicating that in this 
second group individual preferences play a smaller role.
Importantly, with regard to Polish teacher labour markets I have not found strong support 
for the two most often suggested structural dynamics inducing early retirement, i.e. early exit as 
a reaction to falling demand and/or as means of adaptation to changing human capital demands. 
:LWKUHJDUGWRREVROHWHTXDOL¿FDWLRQSUR¿OHV,GRQRW¿QGDQ\LQÀXHQFHRQWKHSURSHQVLW\WR
HDUO\UHWLUHPHQW7HDFKHUVEHLQJTXDOL¿HGLQVXEMHFWVRILQVWUXFWLRQZKLFKORVHLPSRUWDQFHLQ
the amended national curricula do not face early retirement risks any higher than the average. 
As far as falling demand and resulting early retirement pressures are concerned, the data show 
very moderate support for this thesis. A fraction of between-municipality variance in early 
retirement risk can indeed be attributed to varying dynamics of local student populations. In 
both “early retirement” groups it is, however, very low and the estimated effect of percentage 
FKDQJHLQVWXGHQWQXPEHUVLVYHU\ORZDVZHOO\HWVLJQL¿FDQW
In contrast the data show that early retirement risks depend more strongly on the one hand 
on the employment mobility of the prime-age teachers and on the local economic situation 
RQWKHRWKHU)RUERWK³HDUO\UHWLUHPHQW´JURXSV,¿QGVWURQJHIIHFWVRIWKHHVWLPDWHGFKDQFH
RIH[LWPRELOLW\LQWKHJURXSRISULPHDJHWHDFKHUV,QOLQHZLWKWKH¿JXUDWLRQDODSSURDFKWR
analysing labour market dynamics, the employment chances of potential early retirees are to 
DJUHDWH[WHQWLQÀXHQFHGE\ODERXUPRELOLW\RISULPHDJHLQVLGHUV+LJKHUOHYHOVRIODERXU
mobility in the group of prime-age teachers decrease the risk of early retirement. This effect 
is especially pronounced for the group of older “early retirees” (55 to 59 year olds). Also 
LQGLFDWRUVRIUHJLRQDOHFRQRPLFVLWXDWLRQVLQÀXHQFHWKHSUREDELOLW\RIHDUO\H[LWDQGDWWKH
same time substantially reduce its inter-municipality variance in the group of 55 to 59-year-
old teachers. A better regional economic situation translates to lesser early retirement risks 
for 55 to 59-year-old teachers. This effect is, however, far less pronounced for the younger 
“early retirement” group of 49 to 54-year-olds.
All in all the analyses indicate that early retirement transitions of teachers employed in 
Polish public schools are to a substantial degree driven by employee independent factors. 
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(DUO\ UHWLUHPHQW WUDQVLWLRQV DUHPRVW VWURQJO\ LQÀXHQFHGE\RUJDQL]DWLRQDO DQG UHJLRQDO
level factors in the group of 55 to 59 year olds. It can therefore be concluded that at that age 
teachers are most at risk of involuntary early retirement.
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ANNEX
7DEOH$Probability of exiting employment in Polish public schools by age and other factors across 
municipalities. Random slope logistic regression
6SHFL¿FDWLRQV Model A1 Model A2
Age <27 í í
Age 27–48 í í
Age 49–54 í Reference
Age 55–59 Reference 0.34
Age 60–65 í 0.30
Female í í
High work commitment (4th promotion level) í í
2nd promotion level and below 0.59 0.58
3rd promotion level Reference Reference
Fixed term employment 0.94 0.95
Lower university degree 0.26 0.25
Teachers’ vocational training 0.59 0.60
Lower educational level 1.06 1.06
Intercept í í
Intercept variance 0.11 0.13
Random effect variance: age 27–48 0.07 0.11
Random effect variance: age 49–54 0.13
Random effect variance: age 55–59 0.24
Random effect variance: age 60–65
Covariance of intercept and random effect: age 27–48 í í
Covariance of intercept and random effect: age 49–54 0.02
Covariance of intercept and random effect: age 55–59 0.08
Covariance of random effects: age 27–48, age 49–54 í
Covariance of random effects: age 27–48, age 55–59 í
N 312524 312524
N municipalities 2224 2224
Log-Likelihood í í
AIC 123092.7 123096.4
